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Cooperative behaviors are ubiquitous in nature and human society. It is very important to understand the internal mechanism of 
emergence and maintenance of cooperation. As we know now, the offsprings inherit not only the phenotype but also the neigh-
borhood relationship of their parents. Some recent research results show that the interactions among individuals facilitate survival 
of cooperation through network reciprocity of clustering cooperators. This paper aims at introducing an inheritance mechanism of 
neighborhood relationship to explore the evolution of cooperation. In detail, a mathematical model is proposed to characterize the 
evolutionary process with the above inheritance mechanism. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulations indicate that 
high-level cooperation can emerge and be maintained for a wide variety of cost-to-benefit ratios, even if mutation happens during 
the evolving process. 
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As we know now, cooperative behaviours are ubiquitous in 
nature and human society. Typical examples include mutual 
aid [1], communal group defence, coalition formation, and 
cooperative hunting [2,3]. It is well known that cooperation 
among individuals promotes common welfare of the whole 
population and helps individuals survive under some hostile 
environments. However, it may not naturally emerge and be 
maintained because it is costly to individuals and also can 
be easily exploited. On the contrary, selfish agents are nor-
mally favoured by natural selection without further mecha-
nisms. Therefore, the inherent mechanism of cooperation 
has been a major puzzle of evolutionary biology for several 
decades [4–7]. 
To understand the puzzle of cooperation, many research-
ers have introduced various mathematical models to char-
acterize its essence. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma 
game is one representative model [8–11]. In detail, a coop-
erator pays a cost c to contribute a benefit b to its partner 
while a defector pays no cost and contributes no benefits, 
where b>c>0. As we know now, the evolutionary dynamics 
of the prisoner’s dilemma game indicates that defectors are 
favoured by selection while cooperators are eventually 
eliminated. In the evolutionary process of the prisoner’s 
dilemma game, individuals engage in a pairwise game to 
gain their fitness. Not surprisingly, the fitness of defectors is 
always higher than that of cooperators in a well-mixed pop-
ulation. Therefore, the cooperation can hardly naturally emerge 
and be maintained. 
To facilitate cooperation, various mechanisms have been 
proposed in evolutionary dynamics [12–21]. In particular, 
some recent results demonstrate that the interactions among 
individuals can facilitate survival of cooperation through 
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network reciprocity of clustering cooperators [22–26]. Dif-
ferent from the traditional well-mixed population, individuals 
interact only with some neighbors in a structured population. 
In such a heterogeneous environment, cooperators could 
survive by forming cooperative clusters to resist the inva-
sion and exploitation of defectors [27,28]. The above net-
work effect is called network reciprocity. 
Besides network reciprocity, the population structure also 
provides a necessary environment for coevolution. That is, 
in structured population, mobile individuals may migrate 
from one location to another to seek benefits and avoid dis-
advantages, which leads to the updating of population 
structure. As a result, mobile cooperators will always keep 
away from those defectors, which causes the elimination of 
defectors eventually. This is because the defectors can not 
take advantage of the cooperators any longer. In fact, some 
recent results validate the above mechanism and also find 
that cooperation can be preserved at high level in coevolu-
tionary game dynamics [29–35]. 
Note that offsprings are usually reproduced nearby the 
habitat of their parents, and children will often inherit social, 
moral, political or religious beliefs just by proximity to their 
parents [36–38]. That is, an offspring inherits not only the 
traits but also the neighborhood relationship of its parents. 
Moreover, the above evolutionary mechanism can also lead 
to the coevolution of population structure and traits. Differ-
ent from the coevolution caused by migration, individuals 
need not have the cognitive ability to distinguish defectors 
from cooperators in the coevolution caused by inheritance of 
neighbourhood relationship. This paper aims to introduce an 
inheritance mechanism of neighborhood relationship to fur-
ther investigate the evolution of cooperation. 
Following this line, this paper further investigates the ef-
fect of the above mechanism on the evolution of coopera-
tion. In detail, we propose a minimalist stochastic model of 
natural selection with the inheritance mechanism of neigh-
bourhood relationship. To begin with, all individuals are 
distributed in a given lattice. During the evolution, the 
eliminated individuals together with all their connected 
edges are deleted from the population, then offsprings are 
added in the population and also inhabit the neighborhood 
of their parents. Our theoretical analysis and numerical sim-
ulations show that the proposed inheritance mechanism of 
neighbourhood relationship can significantly promote the 
emergence of cooperation. More shockingly, we find that 
the cooperators can automatically cut off those mutated de-
fectors to inhibit propagation of them in our evolutionary 
model. 
The above inheritance mechanism of neighborhood rela-
tionship provides a simple and rigorous explanation for the 
widespread existance of cooperation behaviors. Different 
from some traditional cooperation mechanisms, the inher-
itance mechanism of neighborhood relationship is not based 
on the cognitive ability or social attributions of individuals. 
Moreover, the natural selection instead of social dynamics 
is used as the driving force of population evolution. There-
fore, our developed model can be used to further investigate 
the evolution of cooperation in many biological species es-
pecially microbes, such as the bacterium Vibrio [3] and M. 
xanthus [36–38]. 
The remain paper is organized as follows. Section 1 in-
troduces a coevolutionary model with inheritance mecha-
nism of neighbourhood relationship. The dynamical behav-
iors of this model are further investigated in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 explores the inherent mechanism of the emergence of 
cooperation. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 4. 
1  The mathematical model 
Based on the evolutionary process of a structured popula-
tion with cooperators and defectors, this section introduces 
a coevolutionary model with the inheritance mechanism of 
neighborhood relationship. 
Consider a structured population. The population struc-
ture is characterized by a network, where nodes and edges 
represent individuals and the corresponding neighborhood 
relationships between individuals [39–45], respectively, as 
shown in Figure 1. Due to the limitation of sources, the 
number of individuals and interactions are normally assumed 
to be a constant during the whole evolutionary process. 
At each step, each individual acquires its payoff P by 
playing the prisoner’s dilemma game described by 
 
 Cooperation Defection 
Cooperation bc c 
Defection b 0 
 
with all individuals in its neighborhood. Assume that a co-
operator has k neighbors, where there are i cooperators. 
Then the cooperator has a payoff bick. Similarly, a defec-
tor with j cooperative neighbors gets a payoff bj. To dimin-
ish the accumulation effect of payoff in large-degree nodes, 
the total payoff of an individual is often normalized by the 
number of its neighbors [46]. In detail, the fitness of an in-
dividual is defined by F=1w+wP, where P is the average 
payoff and 0w1 is a parameter adjusting the selection 
intensity. 
After game interaction, all individuals update their strat-
egies. Here, the famous Moran process [47,48] is used to 
characterize the updating process. In detail, an individual is 
randomly chosen to die firstly, then another individual is se-
lected to reproduce an offspring with a probability propor-
tional to its fitness. In the reproduction of offsprings, muta-
tion happens at probability u. That is, the offspring inherits 
the parents’ strategy with probability 1u, but with proba-
bility u, it mutates into a randomly strategy from cooperation 
to defection.  
At the same time of updating the population traits, the 
population structure is also evolving in our model. In detail,  
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Figure 1  Sketch map of updating rule in the evolutionary process with inheritance mechanism of neighborhood relationship. Individuals occupy the verti-
ces of a network. Blue and red nodes denote cooperators and defectors, respectively. The updating process is described by the following two steps. Step 1: 
Randomly choose an individual to die and then remove this node and its edges; Step 2: Select an individual with the probability proportional to fitness to 
reproduce an offspring, add a new node, and then connect this new node to its parent and the other three neighbors of its parent. 
when an individual dies, the corresponding node and all 
edges of this node are removed from the network. And 
when an offspring is produced, a new node is added into the 
network to represent it. To characterize the inheritance 
mechanism of neighborhood relationship, this new node is 
connected to its parent and another d1 nodes which are ran-
domly chosen from the neighbors of its parent. Here, d de-
notes the average degree of the network. Figure 1 shows the 
above updating process of population structure. 
To summarize, the above model describes a complete 
evolutionary process of population with cooperators and 
defectors. It is worth mentioning that there are three typical 
characteristics in the above model. At first, the updating 
rule conforms to the three fundamental principles of natural 
evolution, i.e. reproduction, mutation and selection. Then, 
the individuals need not to possess any cognitive ability and 
social attributes, including punishment and reputation. Fi-
nally, the inheritance mechanism of neighborhood relation-
ship is introduced in this model. 
In this paper, assume that individuals occupy vertices of 
a two dimensional n×n lattice with periodic boundary at 
initial time [8]. Also, the cooperator and defector roles are 
randomly assigned to each individual. 
2  Evolutionary behaviors of cooperation 
2.1  Effect of inheritance mechanism of neighborhood 
relationship 
This paper focuses on how cooperation emerges and is main-
tained during the evolutionary process. In detail, we are con-
cerned mainly with the evolutionary behaviors of cooperation. 
Moreover, we further explore how cooperation behaves with 
the other parameters. 
To begin with, we investigate the evolving process of 
cooperator frequency with the time. Figure 2 shows a typi-
cal evolutionary trace of cooperator frequency based on our 
model, where the population size, cost-to-benefit ratio c/b, 
selection strength w, and mutation rate u are 10×10, 0.2, 0.1 
and 0.01, respectively. The evolutionary process starts from 
an unbiased state with average 50% cooperators in the pop-
ulation. Due to the exploitation of defectors, the proportion 
of cooperators decreases to around 40% in the earlier stage. 
In the traditional evolutionary models, this downward trend 
will keep on and then cooperators will be eventually elimi-
nated out of the population, leading to the puzzle of cooper-
ation. However, intriguingly here, such a scenario does not 
happen. Instead, the cooperators defeat the defectors and 
eventually take over most of or even all of the population at 
some time. Here, the mutation from cooperator to defector 
may cause the fluctuation of the frequency of cooperators.  
We observe that there exists an impressive invasion at 
about the 30000th step, where the cooperators are on the 
verge of extinction. However, they can survive and eventu-
ally take back the whole population. 
The typical evolutionary trace of cooperator frequency in 
Figure 2 indicates two fundamental laws of the above co-
evolutionary model in the following. Firstly, cooperation 
can emerge in our coevolutionary model, where the average 
cooperation level is 0.84 after 10000 generations. Secondly, 
cooperation can be maintained. In particular, cooperators 
can resist the invasion of mutated defectors and preserve a 
high cooperative level. To summarize, the above two phe-
nomena are induced by the inheritance mechanism of 
neighborhood relationship. To validate the proposed inher-
itance mechanism, a control experiment is designed for 
comparison, where the strategies of population are updated 
while the structure of population is fixed. Figure 3 shows 
the average proportion of cooperators for each generation. 
As we expected, without the inheritance mechanism of 
neighborhood relationship, the cooperation level almost 
decreases to zero. 
2.2  Evolution of cooperation behaviors with parameters 
To further understand the effect of the inheritance mecha-
nism of neighborhood relationship, it is necessary to explore 
the influence of other parameters on cooperation behaviors 
in both coevolutionary and control experiments. Figure 4 
shows the average proportions of cooperators in the population  
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Figure 2  A typical evolutionary trace of cooperator frequency in the population. The average cooperation level is 0.84 after 10000 generations. The initial 
cooperators ratio is 50% and the individuals are randomly distributed on a lattice of size 10×10. The cost-to-benefit ratio, selection strength, and mutation 
rate are given by c/b=0.2, w=0.1, and u=0.01, respectively. 
 
Figure 3  The relationship between average cooperation levels and gener-
ations, where the blue and red lines denote the cooperation level of coevo-
lutionary model and the corresponding control experiment, respectively. In 
this figure, every data point is calculated by the average of 20 independent 
realizations. The initial cooperators ratio is 50% and the individuals are 
randomly distributed on a lattice of size 10×10. The cost-to-benefit ratio, 
selection strength, and mutation rate are given by c/b=0.2, w=0.1, and 
u=0.01, respectively. 
as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b in the equilib-
rium of evolutionary process.  
From Figure 4, we have the following two interesting 
observations. At first, the cooperation level is very stable 
for a large scale of cost-to-benefit ratios, which indicates 
that the coevolutionary dynamics is insensitive to small 
values of c/b. Secondly, the cooperation favored threshold 
of cost-to-benefit ratio c/b is extraordinarily high. Starting 
from an unbiased state, cooperation is called to be favored if 
the average cooperator frequency of evolutionary process at 
equilibrium is greater than 0.5. Figure 4 indicates that co-
operation is favored until c/b exceeds 0.93 in the coevolu-
tionary model. Note that cooperation is favored for c/b<  
 
Figure 4  The relationship between average cooperation level and cost-to- 
benefit ratio c/b. The initial cooperators ratio is 50% and the individuals 
are randomly distributed on a lattice of size 8×8. The selection strength 
and the mutation rate are given by w=0.5 and u=0.01, respectively. Here, 
each data point is obtained by averaging the 20 independent realizations. 
And the cooperation level is calculated by averaging the cooperator fre-
quency between 10000-th to 20000-th generations. 
0.25 [22] in death-birth process on periodic lattice. Similar-
ly, the threshold is 0.464 [49] in evolution of cooperation by 
phenotype similarity. Obviously, compared with the above 
two traditional mechanisms, the proposed inheritance 
mechanism of neighborhood relationship is much more ef-
fective for enhancing cooperation. In particular, under the 
above coevolutionary dynamics, cooperation can be favored 
even in some hostile conditions, such as the larger value c/b. 
However, without this coevolutionary mechanism, defectors 
dominate the population in the control experiment as shown 
in Figure 4. 
Figure 5 (a) shows the relationship between average co-
operation level and selection strength w. When there does 
not exist selection, i.e. w=0, the evolutionary behaviors of 
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cooperation are completely characterized by neutral drifts 
[50]. In this case, the cooperator frequency will remain un-
changed from generation to generation in the statistical 
sense. Thus, for w=0, the cooperation level is almost the 
same as the initial cooperator frequency, i.e. 0.5, for both 
coevolutionary and control models. For w>0, the payoffs 
derived from the pairwise game contribute to and cause dif-
ferences in the fitness of individuals. Such differences bene-
fit to the survival of cooperators in the coevolutionary mod-
el. In fact, the cooperation level increases with the selection 
strength. However, in the control experiment, the coopera-
tion level decreases with w. These observations indicate that 
the selection will favor cooperators rather than defectors 
under the inheritance mechanism of neighborhood relation-
ship in the evolutionary process of population.  
To know whether cooperation can be maintained, it is 
necessary to explore the effect of mutation in the evolution-
ary process. According to the literature, most known results 
focus on the emergence of cooperation, instead of the 
maintenance of cooperation. In our coevolutionary model, 
the cooperators can take over the whole population if there 
does not exist mutation as shown in Figure 5(b). However, 
the cooperation level decreases rapidly if there exists muta-
tion. That is, mutation makes survival of cooperation much 
harder. This is because the cooperators face invasion not 
only from outside defectors but also from inner mutated 
defectors if there exists mutation. Though, for a small muta-
tion rate, such as u<0.2, cooperation can still thrive and be 
promoted in some level. Therefore, cooperation can not 
only emerge but also be maintained in our coevolutionary 
model.  
In the coevolutionary dynamics, cooperation is robust 
with respect to the population size and initial structures. In 
detail, the evolutionary features will remain almost un-
changed for different initial structures, such as regular lat-
tice, random graphs, and random geometric graphs, and 
population sizes. For the long-term view, the cooperation 
level is maintained almost the same as shown in Figure 6. 
3  Emerging mechanism analysis of cooperation 
The above results have shown the positive effect of the in-
heritance mechanism of neighborhood relationship on en-
hancing cooperation. However, it is still unclear how this 
mechanism works. In the following, we further explore the 
emerging mechanism of cooperation. 
In detail, the invasion process of a mutated defector into 
a population of cooperators is used to illustrate how defec-
tors are finally eliminated out of the population. The analy-
sis is mainly based on a fundamental property of Moran 
process, i.e. “survival of the fittest”. It means that the indi-
viduals with low fitness will be eventually eliminated out of 
the population and those with high fitness will survive 
[47,48].  
As outlined in Figure 7, at the beginning of the invasion, 
the defector is surrounded by cooperators and thus has the 
largest fitness. Under the Moran process, this defector is 
very likely to be selected to reproduce offsprings. So in this 
stage, the frequency of defectors increases and that of coop-
erators decreases, respectively. Due to the inheritance mech-
anism of neighborhood relationship, these defectors inhabit 
nearby locations in the space as shown in stage 1 of Figure 7. 
With the increase of defectors, the fitness of the neighboring 
cooperators around these defectors decreases rapidly. Thus, 
these cooperators will be eventually eliminated out of the  
 
Figure 5  (a) The relationship between average cooperation level and selection strength w with u=0.01; (b) The relationship between average cooperation 
level and mutation rate u with w=0.1. The red square line denotes the control experiment with fixed structure. The initial cooperators ratio is 50% and the 
individuals are randomly distributed on a lattice of size 8×8. The cost-to-benefit ratio is given by c/b=0.2. Here, each data point is obtained by averaging the 
20 independent realizations. And the cooperation level is calculated by averaging the cooperator frequency between 10000-th to 20000-th generations. 
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Figure 6  The effect of initial population structure and population size on 
the evolutionary behaviors of cooperation. Each data point is obtained by 
averaging the 20 independent realizations. Different colored lines denote 
the cooperation levels on different initial structures. The cost-to-benefit 
ratio, selection strength, and mutation rate are given by c/b=0.2, w=0.1, 
and u=0.01, respectively. 
 
Figure 7  Illustration of an invasion process of mutated defector. Indi-
viduals are distributed in a given space, where red and green nodes denote 
the cooperators and defectors, respectively. To begin with, a cooperator 
mutates into a defector. The defector with the highest fitness survives and 
reproduces many offsprings as shown in Stage 1. At the same time, due to 
the exploitation of defectors, the neighboring cooperators receive a low 
fitness, and thus eventually die out, as shown in Stage 2. As a result, the 
defectors get a very low fitness without cooperators in their neighborhood. 
Therefore, the defectors are eventually eliminated out of the population. 
And the population returns to a state of complete cooperation. 
population as shown in stage 2 of Figure 7. Finally, there 
does not exist any cooperator in the neighborhood of defec-
tors after these cooperators are eliminated. As a result, the 
fitness of these defectors decreases to the lowest. Then all 
defectors are eventually eliminated and the population is taken 
over by cooperators again as shown in stage 3 of Figure 7.  
To summarize, with the inheritance mechanism of neigh-
borhood relationship, the cooperators can automatically cut 
off the neighboring cooperators around the defectors to iso-
late the mutated defectors and then eliminate them. Indeed, 
this explains why cooperators emerge and can be main-
tained in a high level in our coevolutionary dynamics. 
It is well known that a necessary and essential route to-
wards evolution of cooperation is assortment between indi-
viduals of the same type [51]. Cooperative mechanisms, 
such as kin selection [13], multi-level selection [21], pun-
ishment [34], and network reciprocity [12], ultimately, all 
lead to assortment of cooperative interactions. 
In fact, the inheritance mechanism of neighborhood rela-
tionship also leads to the assortment of cooperative interac-
tions. Under the Moran process, individuals living in a co-
operative environment acquire a high fitness and then are 
very likely to be selected to reproduce offsprings. With the 
inheritance mechanism of neighborhood relationship, these 
offsprings locate in the same cooperative neighborhood, 
which leads to a positive feedback of interactions between 
cooperators. In contrast, due to elimination of the neighbor-
ing cooperators, the number of defector-cooperator interac-
tions gradually reduces without mutation. Therefore, in our 
coevolutionary model, the strength of cooperator-cooperator 
assortment is significantly high. In this case, cooperators 
receive much more net fitness benefits from their neighbors. 
This is why cooperation can survive and be maintained at a 
high level even in some hostile conditions, such as high 
cost-to-benefit ratio and mutation rate. 
The essential law of cooperation lies in that it provides 
either a direct or an indirect benefit to cooperators so that 
the fitness of cooperators overwhelms that of defectors 
[52–56]. On the one hand, we have shown that the inheritance 
mechanism of neighborhood relationship enhances the direct 
benefits of cooperators. On the other hand, it can also lead 
to the maximal inclusive fitness of individuals. Indeed, in 
our coevolutionary model, offsprings locate at the neigh-     
borhood of their parents, which keeps relatives together. 
Therefore, interacting cooperators are most likely to be 
relatives [57–59]. Such interactions not only bring direct 
fitness to the individuals involved but also enforce indirect 
inclusive fitness. 
As we know now, the coevolution of structure and strat-
egy is a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of coop-
eration. However, the proposed coevolution mechanism in 
this paper differs from the traditional coevolution mecha-
nisms. Among these results, migration, punishment, or rep-
utation are often regarded as the basic causes of structure 
updating [31–33,35]. Therefore, the individuals are implic-
itly required to have some social attributions and cognitive 
ability to detect the attributions of their neighbors. In con-
trast, in our model, the updating of population structure is 
based on the inheritance mechanism of neighborhood rela-
tionship. And the individuals do not need any additional 
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requirements [60,61]. 
Moreover, some other works update their population 
strategy with social dynamics, such as imitation, personal 
learning, and comparison. Here, the structure of population 
refers to social interactions [53–55]. The above results can 
only explain the formation of cooperation in humans. Dif-
ferent from the above models, our model explicitly adopts 
natural selection as the driving force of evolution. It aims to 
provide a feasible explanation for the mechanism of how 
cooperation emerges and can be maintained in natural evo-
lution. 
It should be especially pointed out that the inheritance 
mechanism of neighborhood relationship takes full ad-
vantage of natural selection andnetwork structure of the 
population. In fact, it can be regarded as the complement of 
network reciprocity on static structures. Note that network 
reciprocity works only under some favorable conditions, 
such as the low cost-to-benefit ratio [56]. However, it may 
not work well if the mutation rate exceeds some given 
threshold. In this case, the cluster of cooperators will break 
down if a mutated defector happens within this cluster. In 
particular, our coevolutionary mechanism can compensate 
for the above two disadvantages. Indeed, it can favor coop-
erators even in some hostile environment. Also, it is robust 
with respect to the variations of selection strength and mu-
tation rate. 
4  Conclusion 
This paper has further investigated the effect of the inher-
itance mechanism of neighborhood relationship on the 
emergence of cooperation in structured population. For the 
inheritance mechanism of neighborhood relationship, the 
offsprings inherit not only the traits but also part of neigh-
borhood relationships from their parents. Our research re-
sults show that selection favors cooperators over defectors 
under the above evolutionary mechanism. In fact, this above 
result holds for a wide variety of conditions, even for ex-
traordinary high temptation of defection. Moreover, even 
the mutation happens, cooperation can still survive and be 
maintained at a high level. In particular, we have illustrated 
the emerging mechanism of cooperation by analyzing the 
invasion pattern of a single defector. Intriguingly, we also 
find that the population can automatically cut off defectors 
to inhibit the expanding of these defectors under the joint 
effect of natural selection and the inheritance mechanism of 
neighborhood relationship. 
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